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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the evidences of benefits from GM papayas adoption in other 
countries, concerns over the loss of export markets and health and 
environmental risks have led to great uncertainty and indecision about 
policies to support biotechnology in Thailand.  Since 2001, field trials 
have been banned and the use of transgenic plants for production, 
consumption, or commercialization has been prohibited, but this ban is 
currently being reconsidered.  This study estimates what the economic 
impact of the adoption of GM papaya would be if Thailand were to 
authorize the use of transgenic technology. We find that papaya 
farmers will benefit significantly from improved yields and even with 
no cost reduction.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Thailand was among the first Asian countries to recognize the benefits 
of agricultural biotechnology. The National Center for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) was established in 1983.  
Since that time BIOTEC, together with the Department of Agriculture 
(DOA) and several universities, has conducted genetic engineering 
research. The Center for Agricultural Biotechnology (CAB) was 
established in 1999 through the collaboration of five academic 
institutions to enhance post-graduate study and to promote 
collaborative research in agricultural biotechnology.  Although 
biotechnology was emphasized during the 6th National Social and 
Economic Development Plan (1987-1991), it has not been consistently 
supported, and policy constraints have increased.   
 
The first field trial of transgenic plants in Thailand was Flavr Savr 
tomato in 1994 for seed production destined for export only.  In 1996, 
field trials of Bt cotton were started but permission for the commercial 
release of Bt cotton has not occurred.  In response to public protest 
concerning the widespread “contamination” caused by Bt cotton field 
trials, the Thai government on April 3, 2001 imposed a ban on all GE 
field trials until national biosafety regulation is implemented.   
Biosafety regulation has yet to be completed, even though work on a 
biosafety guideline began in June 1992.  The Thai government is 
currently rethinking its policy on field trials of transgenic crops and 
has permitted field trials since December 25, 2007, but only by special 
request in government fields.   
 
In 1999, the amendment of the 1964 Plant Quarantine Act 
strengthened the regulation to include all possible genetically modified 
plant varieties.  On March 17, 2000, 40 transgenic varieties, with 
exceptions for grains of genetically modified corn and soybeans, were   2
banned from importation.  On October 14, 2003, an additional 49 
transgenic varieties were listed as prohibited items for imports except 
for processed products.  
 
There is little public information available on the costs and benefits of 
biotechnology to Thai economy and national policies and research and 
application plans are unclear.  The economic evaluation of transgenic 
crops is essential to the development of appropriate future agricultural 
biotechnology policies.  This study provides an ex-ante economic 
evaluation of the use of transgenic papaya in Thailand, since it is in the 
most advanced stage of development among GM crops.  Implications 
from this study could be used to evaluate potential biotechnology 
policies in the future. 
 
2. Development of GM papaya in Thailand 
 
Papaya has traditionally been a staple crop in both the national diet and 
in the mixed cropping system of small farmers in Thailand. It is 
common for both green and ripe consumption and is a major 
ingredient in the daily diet in the Northeast. Thailand is a relatively 
small producer of papaya. In 2006, Thailand produced less than 2% of 
the world’s papaya production, ranking as the world’s 12th largest 
producer (FAOSTAT).  The average yield during 2002-2006 was 2.42 
ton/rai
1 having declined from 3.01 ton/rai during 1992-1996 (Table 1).  
The two most commonly grown varieties are Khakdam and Khaknuan.  
Most of the papaya production is consumed domestically.  The exports 
of papaya are less than 2% of domestic production, and most exports 
are processed products rather than fresh produce.  Seventy four percent 
of total papaya exports quantity was canned, valued at 84% of total 
papaya exports (The Custom Department, 2006). 
                                                                 
1 1 hectare = 6.25 rai   3
Table 1. Papaya production and prices in Thailand, 1988-2007 






(ton)  Planted Harvested 
Price 
(THB/kg) 
1988  112,653 70,457  201,918  1.79  2.87 3.49 
1989  106,964 63,514  182,120  1.70  2.87  4.01 
1990  165,812 114,275  376,525  2.27  3.30  4.16 
1991  159,886 113,448  339,096  2.12  2.99  3.89 
1992  149,228 108,183  346,305  2.32  3.20  3.83 
1993  152,796 116,343  363,579  2.38  3.13  3.92 
1994  161,552 123,600  367,987  2.28  2.98  3.98 
1995  153,280 115,572  342,772  2.24  2.97  4.38 
1996  160,241 119,725  335,433  2.09  2.80  4.41 
Avg. 
1992-96  155,419 116,685  351,215  2.26  3.01  4.10 
1997  153,060 118,051  316,879  2.07  2.68  5.25 
1998  172,793 118,938  367,861  2.13  3.09  5.43 
1999  187,648 138,504  412,138  2.20  2.98  4.87 
2000  155,959 126,422  366,828  2.35  2.90  5.11 
2001  146,248 102,044  290,854  1.99  2.85  5.04 
Avg. 
1997-01  163,142 120,792  350,912  2.15  2.90  5.14 
2002  147,953 118,539  351,693  2.38  2.97  3.89 
2003  140,696 108,974  309,003  2.20  2.84  4.96 
2004  127,343 100,480  277,923  2.18  2.77  5.69 
2005  55,122 34,588  30,961  0.56  0.90  5.89 
2006  83,612 51,067  134,443  1.61  2.63  6.98 
Avg. 
2002-06  110,945 82,730  220,805  1.79  2.42  5.48 
2007  104,968 72,554  195,377  1.86  2.69  9.00 
Growth 
rate 
1997-06  -0.45 -0.57  -0.58  -0.22 -0.02  0.33 
Note: 1 hectare = 6.25 rai         
Source: Department of Agricultural Extension, 2007       4
Angyurekul and Tugsinavisuth (2003) analyzed the papaya industry 
during 1988-2001 and found that one of the most important problems 
was the infestation of Papaya Ring Spot Virus (PRSV), and one of the 
greatest threats to the industry was the the lack of research and 
development of PRSV resistant varieties.  Since PRSV was discovered 
in Northeastern Thailand in 1975, it has spread throughout the country. 
Papaya area and production fell by more than one-half between 1997 
and 2006, and Thailand has changed from being a small exporter to 
being an importer of papaya from neighboring countries.  
 
Several attempts have been initiated to develop PRSV resistant 
papaya.  In 1987, a research team at the Horticultural Research 
Institute, Khon Kaen Agricultural Research Station of DOA bred a 
tolerant variety by crossing the “Florida tolerant” variety with 
Khakdam.  By 1994, three lines of PRSV resistant hybrids, Thapra 1, 
2, and 3 were developed, providing average yields of 10.624 ton/rai.  
Up to 2004 Thapra 2 (renamed to “Khakdam Thapra”) was the 
primary variety recommended by DOA and was distributed to 37 
provinces in the northeast and other regions.  This variety is partially 
resistant to PRSV.  Therefore, after planting it for a while or if planted 
in an infested area, it could still eventually become infected (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 2005).  Currently, no papaya seeds are 
distributed to farmers by the Northeast Regional Office of Agriculture 
(NEROA), due to as of yet unsubstantiated accusations that the station 
allowed genetically modified seeds to escape the confines of the 
station.   
 
GM PRSV resistant was successfully developed by the collaboration 
between Thailand DOA and Cornell University in 1995.  In 1997, the 
research team returned to Thailand with two transformed varieties, 
Khakdam and Khaknuan, which were transferred to the research 
station at Thapra, Khon Kaen province for further breeding and   5
analysis in the confines of a greenhouse. Field trials began at the 
station in 1999 and continued until 2004.  Selected third generation 
lines from both transformed varieties showed 97-100% resistance to 
the virus (Davidson, 2006) and providing an average yield of 11.81 
ton/rai (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2005).  On July 27, 2004, 
Green Peace sealed off an experimental field of GM papaya at Khon 
Kaen Agricultural Research Station and demanded that the 
government immediately destroy all papaya trees, fruit, seedlings, and 
seeds in the Khon Kaen research station to prevent further 
contamination. They claimed that tests conducted by GeneScan 
(HongKong) Ltd. found the contamination of GM papaya in farmers’ 
fields despite the Plant Quarantine Act.   
 
In addition to the research done by DOA, two other projects have 
been intiated to create GM PRSV resistant papaya. The first one was 
under Papaya Biotechnology Network (PBN) of Southeast Asia 
which was supported locally by BIOTEC and and the Plant Genetic 
Engineering Unit (PGEU) at Kasetsart University, Kamphangsan 
campus. The GM PRSV resistant vareity was sucessfully developed 
in work dating to 1997.  Plant materials from Queensland University, 
Australia were twice brought in for the purpose of conducting 
research to create resistance to ring spot virus, and to extend the 
ripening period. The first time was in August 1998, and second time 
was in May 2000.  A field trial was ongoing at PGEU until 2004 
when the moratorium on field testing of GE crops was put in place in 
Thailand. The other was done at Institute of Molecular Biology and 
Genetics at Mahidol University.  The project started in 1994. 
 
3. Economic Evaluation of GM Papaya 
 
Although several studies have evaluated the economic impacts of 
GM crops, only a few were of GM papaya.  Gonsalves et al. (2004)   6
conducted a farmer survey during June–September 1999 in Puna area 
of Hawaii.  They found that the adoption of Rainbow PRSV resistant 
variety was at 76% during May 1998-September 1999.  Sankula and 
Blumenthal (2004) estimated the benefit of PRSV resistant papaya in 
Hawaii by comparing the annual data to 1998 base year when it first 
became available.  They found that the yield increase ranged from 
16-77%, production value increased from 1.14-5.54 million USD 
during 1999-2003, and there was no cost saving benefit.  Brookes 
and Barfoot (2006) summarized the benefits of GM crops in different 
countries. By reviewing the studies by Sankula and Blumenthan in 
latter years (2003 and 2005), they found that GM PRSV resistant 
papaya could provide 16-50% of yield improvement during 1999-
2005.  There was no cost to farmers for acquiring the technology 
during 1999-2003, but since 2004, the cost increased to 42 
USD/hectare.   
 
The Foreign Agricultural Service in Thailand (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2005) evaluated economic benefits of PRSV resistant GM 
papaya in Thailand by collecting primary data from 122 farmers, 83 
villagers, 20 collectors and wholesalers, 41 restaurant owners, 18 
manufacturers and exporters, and from depth interviews of 11 
government officers, lecturers, and researchers.  This study assumed 
that the yield will improve from 2.79 to 42 ton/rai if farmers were to 
adopt GM papaya.  These numbers were obtained by interview with 
Mr. Chakan Sangruksawong, the general director of DOA, who 
claimed that the average yield of papayas nation-wide decreased by 
50% to 2.79 ton/rai due to PRSV infestation.  
 
Based on five different regions, five types of plantation, and types of 
fruits at the time of sales (green or ripe), the study compared farmer’s 
income from growing GM vs non-GM variety.  The estimate of 
average gross income across regions after adopting GM papaya was   7
228,900 THB/rai/crop compared to 15,097 THB/rai/crop of non-GM 
variety. The difference in benefits of GM papaya is greater if grown in 
open space in mixed plantation and selling it ripe.  The estimate of net 
income over total initial investment of GM papaya would be 307,099 
THB/rai/crop, compared to 13,911 THB/rai/crop for the non-GM 
variety.  This study assumes that the price of GM papaya is the same 
as the price of non-GM. 
 
All of the above studies have estimated the farm-level impacts from 
adopting GM papaya, mainly farm income effects, by comparing costs 
and benefits of two alternative varieties each year.  However, they did 
not take into account the impact on equilibrium price, did not cover the 
welfare distribution effect, and did not take into account the impact 
over time.  Thus, it does not represent total economic effects.  Since 
there is no commercial GM crop grown in Thailand, this study uses the 
ex-ante analysis by making assumptions based on scientific data and 
economic environment in Thailand, and evidences from studies in 
other countries.  The economic impact of GM papaya is measured by 
using the concept of economic surplus which could reflect the 
aggregate impact to the country as a whole.  The analysis also 
considers the rate and the time of adoption, and estimates the present 
value of the impact during the study period.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
Alston  et al. (1998) suggested several approaches to evaluate 
agricultural technology.  This paper measures the impacts of GM 
papaya using the economic surplus model.  Despite several criticisms 
of the economic surplus measurement including measurement errors, 
general equilibrium effects, ignoring transaction costs and 
externalities, it is still justisfied when appropriate assumptions about 
impacts of research are being made.  The economic surplus model is   8
also more advantageous than cost-benefit analysis and 
economometric models since it does not assume either perfectly 
inelastic or perfectly elastic supply or demand (Alston et al., 1998: 
54-55).  In addition, the economic surplus calculation incorporates 
international price effects and distributional effects unlike the cost-
benefit analysis.  For the ex-ante analysis in this paper, a partial 
equilibrium model is adopted due to the limitation of information on 
dynamic linkages between sectors.   
 
Since Thailand is a small producer and exporter of papayas, a small 
open exporting economy model is assumed.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
changes in economic surplus from the adoption of GM papayas in a 
small exporting country.  GM papaya will improve the yield whereas 
the cost of chemicals is assumed to remain constant.  This results in 
the downward shift of supply curve from S0 to S1, and the domestic 
demand curve of papayas is assumed to be constant.  The price of 
papaya is determined by the world market at Pw, and will not change 
because of the increasing supply in Thailand.  Consumer surplus, 
thus, remains constant; whereas, producer surplus increases equal to 
the area “abcd”.  In this case, Thailand could increase its export to 
“Q1 – Q0” if GM papaya is accepted in the export markets.   
 
In this analytical framework, the domestic market is assumed to be 
homogeneous.  In other words, consumers cannot distinguish 
between GM and non-GM papayas.  Even though labeling is required 
for GM products
2, but it only covers soybeans and maize, and does 
not cover products sold by small vendors.  Fresh papaya is 
commonly sold in fresh markets by small vendors or sold as prepared 
                                                                 
2 The Minister of Health announcement in 2002 of the GM labeling regulation 
requires that foods containing ingredients derived from GM soybeans and maize in 
the top three components by weight representing more than 5% of the total weight 
and have more than 5% GM of each ingredient must be labeled.    9
dishes by food stalls or restaurants so the labeling regulation will not 

















Figure 1. Changes in economic surplus from GM papaya adoption in a small 
exporting country. 
Source: Adopted from Alston et al. (1998: 227) 
 
It is also assumed that lost of export market is immaterial in this 
framework since most of papaya is consumed domestically.  In 
addition, the largest export market of papaya from Thailand is China 





To measure the change in producer surplus, abcd, in Figure 1, the 










d  c 
C0 
D 
e   10
∆PS = ∆ TS = PW Q0 K(1 + 0.5Kε)      (1) 
 
where  PS is the producer surplus 
    TS is the total surplus 
Pw is the world price 
K is the proportional supply shift = (Pw – e)/Pw 
     ε is the supply elasticity 
 
Using the spreadsheet to calculate annual surplus, it is assumed that 
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where  Kt is the proportionate shift down in the supply curve in period 
t due to GM papaya adoption. 
    E(Y) is the expected proportionate yield change per rai. 
E(C) is the proportionate change in variable input costs per rai 
to achieve the expected yield change. 
 p is the success rate or the probability that GM papaya will 
achieve the expected yield. 
At is the adoption rate (proportional area of GM papaya to total 
papaya production area in year t). 
δt is the rate of annual depreciation of GM papaya (reduction 
of expected yield) in year t . 
 
In this framework, the impacts are assumed to accrue for ten years 
after first adoption, which takes place in year three.  The net present 
value (NPV) is calculated from the annual surplus as follows: 
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where r is the discount factor. 
 
Parameter assumptions are based on experiment/scientific studies of 
GM papaya in Thailand and in other countries.  The technology 
adoption and economic environment assumptions are based on 
secondary information for Thailand.  It is assumed that the success rate 
of GM papaya production is perfect (p=1).  In other words, if farmers 
adopt GM papaya, they are guaranteed to achieve expected yield, and 
there is no yield reduction after each crop (δt = 0).  The discount factor 
is assumed to be at 5%.   
 
The assumptions for this analysis are summarized in Table 2.  Because 
Thailand is a small exporting country, farm price is assumed to be 
equal to the world price.  The average farm price between 2002-2006 
was 5,482 THB/ton (Department of Agricultural Extension, 2007).   
The area of production between 2002-2006 was 110,945 rai.   
Assuming that the potential yield of GM papaya equals to Khakdam 
Thapra, which has the PRSV resistant characteristic and was 
recommended by the Department of Agricultural Extension, to be 
10.624 ton/rai (Prasartsri and Chaikietiyod, no date); whereas, the 
average yield of general papaya during 2002-2006 was 1.785 ton/rai 
(Department of Agricultural Extension, 2007), the yield of GM papaya 
improves by 495%.  The cost of production will not change since most 
current papaya growers do not generally use either pesticides or 
herbicides.  The costs of GM and non-GM seeds are assumed to be the 
same.  This is because the proportional cost of seed is minimal, and the 
government is expected to distribute GM seeds; thus, there is no 
technology fee or seed premium.   12
Table 2. Assumptions of parameters used    
Average total production area, 2002-2006 (rai)   110,945*  
Average production, 2002-2006, Q0 (mt)   220,805*  
Average farm price, 2000-2003, Pw (THB/mt)  5,482* 
Average total value of crop (THB/mt)  1,210,453,010  
Expected GM papaya yield (kg/rai)  10.624 
Average current yield, 2002-2006 (kg/rai)  1.785* 
% Yield increase, E(Y)  496 
% Cost reduction, E(C)   0 
Supply elasticity, ε  1 
Adoption ceiling (% area)  80 
Adoption lag (years)  3 
Years to full adoption  10 
Source: * Department of agricultural extension, 2007   
 
A three year lag to initial adoption from the date GM papaya is 
permitted will be assumed.  GM papaya varieties are almost ready to 
be used, but still need to pass biosafety field testing, and may take 
some time for seed propagation.  A ceiling adoption level of 80% is 
assumed to be achieved within ten years.  The incremental increase of 
the area of GM papaya adoption is assumed to be the same each year.  
Results are presented for total papaya production area under two 
scenarios.  In the first scenario, the production area is assumed to be 
equal to current average production area during 2002-2006 (110,945 
rai).  Under the second scenario, production area is assumed to the 
higher area that existed during 1997-2001 (163,142 rai) when the 
PRSV infestation was less severe.  In this scenario, the adoption 
ceiling is also assumed at 80%, and the adoption area increases equally 
from year 4 to year 13 from 110,945 to 163,142 rai. 
   13
6. Results  
 
The estimates of welfare impacts are presented in Table 3.  Under 
scenario 1, the model suggests that GM papaya will be generating 
about USD 413 million, or nearly 13 billion THB in annual benefits by 
the time of full adoption, in year 13 and will generate a total 
discounted value of USD 1,098 million or 34 billion THB.  In the 
second scenario, where it is assumed that the total papaya area returns 
to the 1997-2001 average area, the total discounted economic surplus 
is estimated at USD 1,456  million (45 billion THB). 
 
Table 3. Economic surplus of GM papaya adoption   
Year Total  surplus 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  
% of area 
adoption 
Total area = 110,945 rai 
(17,751 ha) 
Total area = 163,142 rai 
(26,103 ha) 
    (million  THB) (USD) (million  THB) (USD) 
0  0  0 0 0 0 
1  0  0 0 0 0 
2  0  0 0 0 0 
3  0  0 0 0 0 
4 8  515.26  16.62  515.26  16.62 
5  16  1,200.88 38.74 1,263.66 40.76 
6  24  2,056.88 66.35 2,271.93 73.29 
7  32  3,083.25 99.46 3,566.78  115.06 
8 40  4,279.99  138.06  5,174.93  166.93 
9 48  5,647.10  182.16  7,123.10  229.78 
10 56  7,184.58  231.76  9,438.01  304.45 
11 64  8,892.43  286.85  12,146.37  391.82 
12 72  10,770.65  347.44  15,274.91  492.74 
13 80  12,819.24  413.52  18,850.34  608.08 
NPV (5% discount 
rate)  34,033.68 1,097.86 45,136.64 1,456.02 
Note: 1 USD = 31 THB         14
7. Conclusions 
 
This study estimates benefit for GM-PRSV resistant papaya.  The 
papaya industry has been severely affected by PRSV, with national 
production in 2007 falling to half of its level in 1999.  Adapted 
transgenic papaya varieties have been developed, suggesting that seeds 
could be made available to farmers within a relatively short time.   
Informal evidence suggests that farmers in Thailand would be willing 
to adopt GM varieties once they are commercially available.  GM 
crops have already provided large economic benefits in several 
countries of the world, and hold great promise for delivering large 
benefits in Thailand once biosafety protocols are established.  If 
Thailand is able to return its papaya industry to the size that they had a 
decade ago, and if GM varieties are successful, Thailand stands to reap 
economic benefits of more than a billion dollars. The majority of these 
benefits would accrue to small farmers.     15
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